I. Introduction
The need to accelerate privatization in Eastern Europe is the paramount economic policy issue facing the region. If there is no breakthrough in privatization of large enterprises in the near future the entire process could be stalled for political and social reasons for years to come, with dire consequences for the reforming economies of the region.
It should be the main job of the international institutions such as the World Bank and EBRD to help accelerate the process of privatization by providing urgently needed financial and technical support for the key operations of mass privatization. The operating guidepost of the World Bank should be that privatization is urgentand politically vulnerable -and that privatization should almost always preceed restructuring, at least for industrial enterprises.
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Much of this paper is based on joint work with David Lipton. I would like to thank the World Institute for International Economics Research (WIDER) for generous support. 2 The Government of Poland has enunciated a basic policy that enterprise restructuring should in most cases follow privatization, and be taken at the initiative of the privatized enterprise. Nonetheless, within the bureaucracy there are powerful groups arguing that many enterprises should be restructured as a prelude to privatization.
The World Bank should be constantly on guard lest its support for restructuring policies inadvertently play into the hands of bureaucrats trying to reassert their influence over the economy. (Since the World Bank itself has a past tradition of encouraging government-led sectoral policies, some self-policing will be vital here).
It should noted that in Eastern Europe, most of the privatizations in the next couple of years will involve industrial 1 The details concerning privatization differ throughout the region, though the political vulnerability of the process and the consequent need for rapid action are common to all of the countries. The countries differ in the scale of efforts that are needed, the specific nature of the political conflict over privatization, and the extent of progress that has been achieved to date.
Since it would be impossible to cover the entire region comprehensively and acurately, I choose instead to focus on a single country, Poland. The paper is an update, after six months, of the discussion in Lipton and Sachs (1990) .
The Current Situation
The situation in Poland regarding privatization is as follows.
The basic privatization law was passed in July 1990, and the Ministry of Ownership Transformation (MOT) was set up under the new law. Since the introduction of the law, small-scale privatization of shops and other small service units has proceeded very rapidly (usually under the authority of local governments), with an estimated 60,000 shops either leased or sold to the private sector during 1990 and 1991. Another few hundred thousand totally new firms that are already subject to domestic or international competition. (The most egregious cases of multi-plant monopolies in Poland are in the process of being broken up under the authority of the Anti-Monopoly Agency). This situation differs from that of the U.K. in the 1980s, where many of the privatizations involved (alleged) "natural monopolies," such as telecommunications, railroads, or public utilities. In those cases, privatization also required an accompanying regulatory policy for the newly privatized firms.
In Eastern Europe, privatization of telecommunications, utilities, railroad transport, and the like, are generally being put off until later in the privatization process. 2 private establishments in the service sector have also been started from the ground up.
As a result of the small-scale privatization, around 7 0 percent of retail trade is now in private hands, and wholesale trade is rapidly being taken over by the private sector. Truck transport has also been substantially privatized (it is estimated that more than one half of the trucks in the country are in private hands).
Privatization has also proceeded rapidly in domestic wholesale trade, international trade, and construction. Moreover, there are now an estimated 1,312 joint ventures between foreign firms and Polish enterprises (in many cases, Polish state enterprises), which have also contributed to the partial privatization of the economy. Agriculture has long been about 7 5 percent privately owned.
In industry, however, the situation is far less bright. Of the estimated 3,107 industrial (mining or manufacturing) enterprises in the state sector, only about 100 to 150 have been privatized to date. The main method, used for medium-sized enterprises (of around 500 employees or fewer) has been leveraged buyouts by workers, in a process termed "liquidation" by the Polish authorities.
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Another 7 were privatized at the end of 1990
through "traditional methods": 5 large firms through initial public offerings, one firm through a trade sale, and one firm through a ^This term is used because under the process, the old state enterprise is terminated and a new enterprise (owned by the worker and management) is established based on the property of the old enterprise.
management buyout.
Some dozens of other state enterprises have been partially privatized through joint ventures with foreign investors.
The great majority of the large-scale industrial enterprises remain in public hands. It is also estimated that around 6,400 private industrial firms are now in operation.
Overall, probably three-fourths of industry by value added remains in state hands.
While nobody has yet made a careful assessment of the extent of private ownership in Poland, it is probably the case that up to 40 or 45 percent of the economy is now in private hands. This estimate is a bit higher than usual, but it tries to take into account that a significant amount of private economic activity is currently unmeasured by the official statistical agencies.
In addition to actual privatization, the legal basis for private capital ownership has also improved, with the establishment of the stock exchange (opening this month), and new securities laws and foreign investment laws. Land ownership rights have also been clarified in legislation this year. The government has recently approved plans in April 1991 for the privatization of the banking system, with two or three of the nine state commercial banks targetted for privatization during 1991. Also, around 100 enterprises have been commercialized, that is converted to jointstock company form with 100 percent Treasury ownership.
The government has also made a clear policy commitment to rapid privatization in the next five years. The intention is that by the end of 1993, more than one half of the 7,000 state-owned 4 enterprises will be in private hands, and that by the end of 1995, the economy will have an ownership structure similar to that of Western Europe.
The dangers of the current situation
The gross economic inefficiencies arising from the socialist ownership structure are widely understood in Poland, and have prompted the government's bold privatization goals. Nonetheless, there remain enormous risks to the process of privatization, and a real possibility that the process could still become paralyzed.
These risks underscores the urgency of making a breakthrough in the privatization process in Poland this year.
First, there is the risk of renewed macroeconomic instability, that could derail the entire reform program. In the current circumstances, the wage pressures are unrelenting, and threaten a renewal of a wage-price spiral and large budget deficits. Workers and managers in the state enterprises constitute a coalition to maximize the short-run income. There is no internal wage bargaining, since the managers (often elected by the workers) tend to side with workers in wage disputes with the government. It is only a slight exaggeration to say that the Finance Minister is the only man in the country that actively fights for wage restraint.
And this is clearly an untenable position: he reports not to a board of directors, but to the voters. Not surprisingly, the government's brave and correct incomes policy vis-a-vis the state enterprises has become the focal point of public protest and 5 opposition to the government's policies.
Second, there is the risk is that political parties will try to get their tentacles around the state enterprises in Poland. As the Italians, Argentines, and so many others have amply demonstrated, the state enterprises can be a seemingly bottomless gold mine for patronage and party financing.
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The political parties will find an active base of support among constituencies in the bureaucracy, and among enterprise workers and managers, all of whom are stakeholders in the enterprises and are resisting privatization except when the privatization includes an adequate sidepayment (such as equity participation, guarantees of future employment, debt relief for the enterprise, and so on).
Third, there is the risk that privatization will become increasingly associated in the public's mind with unemployment, thereby forcing the government to scale back its plans. It is inevitable that major political parties will begin to champion the cause of "slow" (or no) privatization, together with government-led bailouts of firms, as an electoral response to widespread fears of 4 Privatizers should take heed of the recent dire conclusions of the Financial Times regarding Italy. John Wyles writes:
The reach of the political parties is extraordinary in Italy, and has lengthened in the post-war period because of the republic's inheritance of a vast system of publicly owned banks and industries. Few impartial observers see how this public sector can be sustained in the 1990s as it encounters the fundamental constraints of EC rules and Italian public debt. (Emphasis mine) (Financial Times, April 6/7, 1991 According to the club, because state-run enterprises will prevail in Poland for the next ten years, a plan to ensure their efficiency should be drawn up. The club proposes to turn these firms into joint-stock companies of the state treasury, which will be later transformed into regional holding companies in competition with each other. They should be entitled to stock turnover and to property transformations. The companies would be controlled by the workers, through representatives on the supervisory boards.(Emphasis added) Fourth, there is the risk that other constituencies will also slow the process of privatization. Former owners of property are pressing for restitution of former property, even though a widescale process of restitution (or "reprivatization") would surely end up with a mountain of lawsuits fighting over unclear property rights based on claims one-half century old. Nonetheless, many former owners are wealthy or politically connected, so that the issue of restitution remains a potential trap.
Ironically, foreign investment bankers also constitute an important "interest group" since they know that standard British-style privatizationbased on detailed valuations of enterprises, followed by public offerings -promise a mountain of fees, even if the method is too slow to be the basis of privatization in Poland. The fear is that restitution will open up an endless stream of lawsuits challenging the title to particular properties. Not only will the properties directly affected by claims lack clear ownership for years to come, but investors will also be reluctant to proceed with purchases of other properties for fear that they too will become embroiled in restitution claims at a later date.
Another reason why the privatization process is generally believed to be "on track" is the accurate sense that much is changing rapidly in Poland. Virtually every day the press reports another enterprise that has been prepared for privatization, or that another joint venture has been started.
Since more than 60,000 small shops have already been privatized, as well as hundreds of medium-size enterprises through worker-management purchases or joint ventures, the forward progress seems to be marching forward with inevitability. Yet since the large enterprises are as yet largely untouched by privatization, the sense of progress is overstated.
II. Methods of Rapid Privatization
Several methods for speeding privatization have teen suggested, and a variety of techniques will have to be employed to guarantee that the government meets its targets. Each one will require an improved management capability of the government, and international technical assistance. But most of all, it will require the concerted intention of the Polish government to make a breakthrough in the near future -before this special opportunity for decisive action drifts away.
The original intention among many senior officials in the Consider merely the question of the public's financial holdings, for comparison with the capital value of the industrial enterprises. The post-tax profits of the largest 500 state-owned firms are approximately $5 billion. With a price-earnings ratio of 5, the capital value of the largest 500 firms is around $2 5 billion. The public's financial holdings in the banking system total approximately $10 billion, only forty percent of the capital value of the largest firms at the modest P-E of 5. And taking into account that other property in addition to the 500 large enterprises is also to be privatized, it is clear that in order to privatize through IPOs, the share prices would have to be at very low price-earnings ratios, which in turn would risk a socially unacceptable concentration of share ownership. The alternatives are to transfer the shares to the public freely by some means (as recommended below); or to sell the shares on a leveraged basis, which would pose its own risks and complications.
In the summer of 1990, the government had the intention to privatize around 20 enterprises by IPOs during the second half of 1990. In the fall, this was scaled back to 5 enterprises. These enterprises were offered for privatization via IPOs in December.
When the shares were undersubscribed for some of the firms, the closing date was extended to early January.
In the event, only three of the five enterprises were fully subscribed by the general public; the shares of the other two were purchased by a new state development bank in order to complete the IPO.
The valuations of the five companies had taken several months and had cost about $4 million in fees to the foreign investment banks, and several millions of dollars more in success bonuses.
The baseline fees to the investment banks was about 12 percent of the sales price of the firms (around $31 million in tendered shares, some of which were bought by the state bank). With bonuses included the overall payments probably constituted around 25 percent of the value of the five companies. One of the three companies that had been completely subscribed, the Krosnienskie ("Krosno") Glassworks, quickly fell into serious financial difficulties after the public offering, and it expected that its share price will decline significantly in secondary trading when stock market trading begins later in April.
8 8 There is of course nothing wrong with a decline in the secondary market price except for the fact that the government had deliberately set the prices low in order to encourage capital gains and subsequent enthusiasm in the public for share purchases. Even when the government tries to pick five "winners" out of hundreds of firms, it turns out to be hard to do.
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As a result of this expensive and time-consuming experience, the Ministry of Privatization has recently and wisely cut back its plans for the rate of IPOs.
The Privatization Minister has recently announced that Poland will not continue with bunched sales, but will instead conduct IPOs on a one-by-one basis. It is now assumed that at most a few dozen enterprises will be privatized through IPOs during 1991.
Transferring Ownership to Insiders
A far simpler method of privatization is to transfer the ownership of the enterprises to the insiders, that is, the management and workers in the firms. This can be done rapidly through direct giveaways, leverage buyouts, or some combination (leveraged buyouts at concessional prices). Indeed, it would be possible, were it desired, to give away the entire enterprise sector to the current insiders in a very short period of time.
Transfers or sales of shares to insiders should be widely employed -and more widely than is now the case -but should be subject to clear standards and limitations.
One key problem here is fairness. While insiders should surely receive some explicit property rights in their enterprises to compensate them for their current implicit property rights, a complete transfer of enterprises to the insiders at very low prices would unfairly benefit the insiders relative to the rest of society. The work force in state industrial enterprises totals about 3.6 million workers in a labor force of 18 million, and a 13 population of 38 million. Some workers are in highly profitable enterprises while others are in bankrupt enterprises.
Another problem with insider privatization is efficiency. In general, worker ownership is desirable neither for the workers, who should diversify their capital not concentrate it, nor for the capital structure of the firm, which should have outside owners as well as inside owners. A firm owned mainly by its workers tends to be isolated from the capital markets, since potential outside investors are concerned that inside owners (who control the firm)
will appropriate the profit stream. Worker owners, for example, The Polish Privatization Law passed in July 1990 attempted to allow for, but to strictly limit, insider privatizations. The law allows for a limited concessional sale of shares to workers.
Specifically, workers are entitled to buy up to 20 percent of the shares of the enterprise at half price, subject to the proviso that the total value of the concessions to the workers (the half price times the number of shares purchased) must not exceed one year's wage bill of the enterprise. Since the law calls for sales at half price, and the Polish privatization authorities have interpreted this to mean a "market price," the concessional sales approach has so far been employed only in cases when the firm is being sold by some other method. In the five IPOs undertaken at the end of 1990, for example, the workers purchased 20 percent of the shares in each case. Thus, the concessional transfer of shares to the workers has so far played no role in speeding the process of privatization.
If the law had simply granted the workers ten percent of the shares for free, then the direct transfer of shares to workers could have been used to speed the privatization process without the agony of determining the "price" of the shares. And even if the 9 As an example, suppose that the enterprise shares are valued at $100 million. A sale of 20 percent of the enterprise shares at half price would mean a sale for $10 million. If the annual wage bill is greater than $10 million, then the law authorizes purchases by workers of the full $20 million of shares for $10 million. If the annual wage bill is only $6 million, say, then the law entitles the workers to purchase only $12 million of shares on a concessional basis (12 percent of the enterprise), at the half price of $6 million. government sticks with the plan to make concessional sales to the workers at half price, it could still choose to use the book value of the enterprise, rather than a market price, as the basis for the sale of shares to the workers.
Since the start of 1991, there has been a promising advance in insider privatization for medium-size firms, generally of about 500 employees or less. The government has approved about 100 leveraged buyouts by worker-management groups of these relatively small firms. The worker-manager group seeking the enterprise buys the enterprise with an up-front payment of about 20 percent of value (based on a quick outside valuation that in fact relies heavily on the book value). The rest of the enterprise is purchased with a loan from the government, that is to be amortized over several years.
This process has been given the misleading label of "liquidation" in the Polish privatization parlance, since formally the state enterprise is liquidated and the property of the enterprise is transferred (in its entirety) to the new worker-owned entity.
Outsider Privatizations
The government has wisely operated on the premise thnat outsider privatization (sales or transfers of shares other than to workers and managers in the enterprises) will be the key method for privatization of large industrial firms. There are four different groups of outsiders who can own shares: small investors in the general public; foreign investors; financial intermediaries (banks, pension funds, mutual funds), whose shares in turn would be owned by the general public; and other industrial enterprises.
The government's original hope was to transfer shares to the general public mostly through IPOs, a process that has proved, predictably, to be one of frustration. As already noted, the public has limited savings, and lacks experience with share ownership. Moreover, prudent share ownership by the public requires a set of institutions (the stock market, securities laws, regulatory oversight, institutional means to diversify risk, and so on), that is only now coming into existence.
Foreign investors are another important potential source of outside investors, but here too, the process of privatization is currently fraught with difficulties. Not only is it politically untenable to privatize the economy mainly by sales to foreigners, but the current arrangements for sales to foreigners are particularly troubling. The potential foreign investor faces two paths, joint ventures and outright purchases, each of which involves a distinct and somewhat vague structure of bargaining. In both cases, the foreign investor must generally negotiate with the manager of the enterprise, the workers council, and the government.
The fact that the potential investor must negotiate with the enterprise management virtually guarantee that bad offers may get accepted while good offers get rejected.
A manager naturally considers a foreign bid from the point of view of the manager's own future management role and also whether they he will get a "cut" of the action in the takeover. The workers' council is of course mainly interested in guarantees of future employment and wage levels. Neither the manager nor the workers' council has much obvious interest in the capital value of the offer itself. Managers might accept low bids for the firm if they receive a cut of the action, while they might turn down good bids that might lead to the replacement of the manager. It is as if takeover offers in the U.S. were to be accepted or rejected by managers and workers rather than by shareholders (or by the board of directors acting on behalf of shareholders). 
Financial intermediaries as outside investors 10
In the U.S., court decisions regarding takeovers have gone to some lengths to guarantee that the takeover offers are judged by boards of directors according to the interests of the shareholders of the firm, not by the insiders.
Speaking crudely, after a takeover bid puts an enterprise "in play," the board of directors is obligated to try to obtain the highest bid for the firm.
In most advanced market economies, more than half of the equity is owned by financial institutions, including banks, pension funds, and investment trusts (or mutual funds). The capitalization of financial intermediaries offers an enormously promising way to proceed with rapid privatization, though this method is almost wholly unexploited to date.
(See Lipton and Sachs, 1990, for a more detailed discussion of the proposals in this section).
There 
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The case for giving shares to the banks is very strong. Since the banks are the one existing financial institution in Poland capable of holding and managing corporate equities, it would be natural to use them for this purpose. Moreover, a growing body of international evidence and theoretical reasoning points to the conclusion that banks are excellent candidates for share ownership in that they provide particularly effective corporate governance.
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Banks in Germany and Japan develop intimate relationships with their corporate clintele based partly on their equity holdings in the corporations to which they lend.
The close relationship with of industrial enterprises and banks is especially important when other capital markets, such as bond markets, are relatively weak, as was the case in post-war
Germany and Japan at least until very recently. In such a circumstance, industrial enterprises depend importantly on longterm bank loans for capital investments. In Poland, it is likely that long-term bond markets will remain relatively undeveloped for several years, so that bank lending will play a predominant role in the economy.
In general, the equity holdings of the German and Japanese banks are not of a controlling amount, but are enough to give the banks a seat on the board of the industrial enterprises, and to
The finance studies stress that bank ownership of corporate equities tends to foster a healthy long-term relationship between the banks and the industrial enterprises, a relationship that contributes especially to a long planning horizon of the industrial enterprises.
See, for example, the favorable discussion of universal banking in Cable (1985) , Aoki (1988) , and Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1990a,1990b) . percent of the corporate equity of the top 500 enterprises could be deposited into five funds, each receiving four percent of the enterprise shares initially (after which the shares would be tradeable by the pension fund managers). A portion of the industrial workforce would then be transferred from the public system to the new private system. After the worker is transferred from the state system to the private system, the worker's payroll tax would be converted into a contribution to one of the new private pension funds.
It would probably take several years to phase in such a system. Careful preparations would be needed to account for budgetary effects of the changeover from a public, pay-as-you-go system to a private, funded system, and to protect the pension benefits of the workers as they join the new system. Decisions would have to be taken carefully regarding the freedom of entry of new pension plans. Nonetheless, part of the process could start quickly, with the allocation of equities to the new pension funds and the licensing of pension fund managers. Hooking up the workforce to the pension funds would take more time, but could be accomplished after the funds themselves are set up.
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A third way to privatize through financial institutions would In the interest of simplicity, 1 would recommend that individuals be randomly assigned to investment trusts without any choice (e.g. based on the number of their national identity card).
In turn, the Treasury's shares would be randomly allocated to the investment trusts, again with no choice. There would seem to be little gain to expending great efforts in auctioning the shares to the investment funds when these funds will be free to trade their initial allocations after they are received. For small and medium-sized firms, say with less than 1000 employees, the preferred form of privatization should be some form of worker-management buyouts, on a leveraged and concessional basis (similar to the "liquidation" procedure now in use in Poland).
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All small firms should be put on notice that during a short time interval (say, six months) they may organize a leveraged workermanagement buyout on highly concessional terms spelled out by the government. Certain basic procedures would have to be followed in the design of the buyout (such as the right to participate for all members of the workforce on equitable terms).
In the case that no group of workers and managers chooses to purchase the firm during the allowed period, then the government would automatically assign the enterprises to investment banks in order to carry out trade sales to domestic and foreign investors.
Note that even in the case of a trade sale, the workers in the enterprise would be entitled to a portion of the ownership on a discounted basis according to the privatization law. The combination of worker-management buyouts and trade sales could 13 If the cutoff for "medium-sized" firms is put at 1,000 workers,, this covers 2,200 of the 3,200 state industrial enterprises, and constitutes approximately 25 percent of the labor force in the state industrial sector. If the cutoff is instead put at 500 workers, that would include 1,400 enterprises with about 10 percent of the state industrial workforce. 27 result in the privatization of nearly all 2,200 state industrial enterprises with 1,000 employees or fewer in the coming year.
(Remember that around 60,000 small shops have been privatized during the past year).
Triaging Large Enterprises
For large firms (defined here arbitrarily as firms with more than 1000 employees), the process of privatization will typically involve the distribution or sale of shares to several groups, including the workers and managers, financial institutions, households, and foreign investors.
For each of the firms, it should be possible to sketch the basic method of share sales and distribution at the outset of the process. Most will follow a set course (with some shares to workers, banks, investment funds, and so on), while a small proportion of firms will be treated on an individualized basis from the beginning.
There are a few dozen very large, capital-intensive enterprises for which a foreign investor is clearly necessary to bring new technology, foreign management, and an infusion of capital to the firm. For these firms, it is extremely important to initiate the privatization process from the MOT, rather than to leave the negotiations to the enterprise itself. The Ministry should designate the list of firms for which it will negotiate with foreign partners.
The two car companies, FSO and FSM, are clear examples where future operations depend on attracting a leading foreign partner in 28 the near future. Investment banks will be necessary to help carry out the negotiations of such ventures. In the cases of sales to foreign partners, the government can retain, with little danger, a minority block of shares after the sale or merger with the foreign company, since the merger agreement will entail foreign management control. Eventually, this minority block of shares can be sold to the public. Workers will receive a concessional block of shares as well as defined by the privatization law.
There is another small group of firms that can be targetted from the outset for IPOs to domestic investors, in cases when it is particularly attractive to create a large population of small shareholders. The state-owned commercial banks would seem to be ideal candidates for IPOs, in view of the fact that commercial banks are prone to conflicts of interest (that is, various subtle and unsubtle forms of self-dealing) when their ownership is highly concentrated in particular hands.
14 The lack of strong shareholder control over bank management that will result from the IPOs can be compensated by the regulatory oversight of the banks by the National Bank of Poland.
A third group of firms reguiring special treatment from the outset are the firms that must clearly be closed down. One obvious group of firms that must be closed are firms that relied almost entirely on the Soviet market, which has now collapsed, and that H The risk of self dealing is greatest when the commercial banks are owned by non-financial enterprises that use the bank as a source of loans.
Note that it is generally prudent, indeed desirable, for banks to own portions of industrial firms, while it is generally undesirable for industrial firms to own banks.
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will be unable to shift production to the domestic market or to the West.
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It makes little sense to expend the effort to privatize enterprises that are soon to be closed, especially since the privatization itself can create a new pressure group that will start fighting for subsidies or trade protection in order to keep the enterprises alive. This is certainly not to say -as some do -that privatization should only be for the firms in the "best" financial shape, or that firms should be financially "healthy" to merit privatization, but rather that the clear and persistent lossmakers on the verge of insolvency should be removed from the privatization process.
A procedure for mass privatization For the hundreds of enterprises that are not targetted at the outset for sales to foreign investors, for IPOs, or for closure, there should be a process of mass privatization based largely on the distribution of shares to workers and financial intermediaries.
A basic "cookie-cutter" approach, in which each of these hundreds of firms is treated in a similar way, is appropriate. While such a standardized approach might seem simplistic, it is the only realistic way to process a large number of firms, and even more importantly, to cut down on the amount of bargaining and rent-15 A taskforce of management advisors and investment bankers has been examining the prospects of around 4 0 firms hard hit by the collapse of the Soviet market. Their preliminary conclusions are that a large proportion of these firms will need to be closed down, since many have inadequate technologies in order to be able to retool and reorient to other markets. seeking that will take place between the enterprises, the The mass privatization should begin with the concessional distribution of shares to the workers and management in the enterprises. As noted earlier, the law envisions that up to 20 percent of the shares should go to the workers at "half price," but the lack of a clear "price" has so far meant that this provision has not been helpful in speeding privatization. For purposes of implementing the privatization law, it would be highly desirable simply to choose the book value of the enterprise shares as the basis for setting the concessional price of shares for the workers.
The practical implication would be to avoid the need for an independent valuation or for an actual public sale of shares in order to determine the price for the sales to the workers. should have a clear procedure for appointing a trustee to consider the adequacy of the bid, and perhaps to solicit competitive bids.
The free distribution scheme should not stand in the way of more "normal" methods of privatization when potential buyers have identified themselves. The mass privatization scheme is merely to be used because the vast majority of firms will not receive adequate bids in the next few months.
Some measures to accompany rapid privatization
There are several tasks that should be carried out in concert with the privatization process in order to allow a proper functioning of the capital markets.
First, and most important, is the design and implementation of clear bankruptcy procedures for state-owned companies. There is no clear legal mechanism for closing state-owned firms at this moment.
The result is a massive bleeding of state assets that is out of 34 control, and will be very expensive for the Treasury, and will lead to a signficant misallocation of capital resources.
Loss-making firms with no prospects of recovery are currently able to continue to operate with impunity by running down bank balances and liquidating assets. Several firms in the Soviet-trade sector have been found recently to be living off of such asset liquidations, without any realistic prospects for generating future cash flows from production. Workers and managers in these enterprises realize that they are in an endgame: since the enterprise is likely to fail in any event, their best strategy is to "milk" the enterprise for all they can get in the short term.
Wage demands are strong in such enterprises despite the weak financial condition of the firm, since workers know that even with wage restraint the enterprise is likely to fail.
The problem is that neither the government nor the creditors of a loss-making enterprise (mainly the state banks) have clear legal procedures for forcing a suspension of operations of the enterprise and liquidating or reorganizing the firm. The government should create an administrative procedure whereby the creditor banks are able to intervene to protect their claims on the enterprises before the enterprise assets are dissipated. For such a procedure to operate, there must be a clear mechanism by which the creditors benefit from the enterprise liquidation -either by receiving the cash generated by the sale of enterprise assets, or by taking over the equity of a financially restructured firm. Such mechanisms (akin to Chapters 7 and 11 respectively of the U.S.
Bankruptcy Code) do not now operate.
Because of the large number of firms that must be liquidated, and the absence of an experienced court system to manage the process, there is the need for expedited administrative procedures.
Creditors should have the authority to force firms into the hands of a government-appointed administrator, who will have the responsibility to liquidate the firm, perhaps operating in conjunction with the MOT, the courts, and with outside advisors. 
V. The Role of the International Financial Institutions
The international institutions have a crucial role to play in the privatization process. To carry out this role, it is essential that they first recognize the importance of speed. Otherwise, the the World Bank and other institutions might inadvertently slow the process of privatization by fostering the illusion of governmentled restructuring of the industrial sector as the "prelude" to privatization.
The task of mass privatization will require large-scale administrative support, much of it employing international expertise, and a flexible expenditure of funds to recruit that expertise. Most international support for privatization -whether from the World Bank, the EBRD, the Know-How Fund, etc. -comes with so many strings attached that it is hard to employ flexibly.
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Special efforts should be made to increase the operational flexibility of donated funds.
It is useful to reiterate the tasks that require urgent support. In each case the international institutions can provide vital financial support for the task:
legal assistance on the design of privatization procedures, including the design of worker-management buyouts, auctioning procedures, appointments of trustees in cases of foreign bids, preparation of contracts for financial intermediaries, including pension funds and mutual funds financial assistance in the design of the privatization of the pension system (which is, as yet, not worked out in detail) recruitment of investment trust management groups and pension fund management groups identification and training of supervisory board members, especially with the support of international executive search firms identification and training of management teams for selected state industrial enterprises that are in the process of privatization management assistance for state commercial banks in the process of privatization, including training to hold and manage industrial equities funding to recruit international investment banking groups to carry out trade sales and IPOs for the enterprises that will not participate in the mass privatization process
With an ambitious timetable and careful coordination among the Polish Ministry of Ownership Transformation, the World Bank, and the EBRD, it should be possible to set up the teams to carry out these tasks, and thereby to put the privatization program on a rapid and irreversible course. But the opportunity to do so may last only for a few months. After that, the encroaching political 39 realities could well slow the process dangerously.
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